The turboprop-versus-regional-jet question raised in this discussion touches on one of the more consequential structural differences between US domestic aviation and markets like Southeast Asia, and the answer lies less in aircraft economics than in labor agreements, scope clauses, and airport infrastructure history. Turboprops such as the ATR 72-600 are genuinely cheap to operate—fuel burn, maintenance, and crew costs per seat-mile are often 20-30% lower than a comparable regional jet like the Embraer E175 or CRJ900 on short sectors under 300-400 nautical miles. Airlines in Indonesia, the Philippines, and similar archipelagic nations lean on ATRs precisely because short hops between small islands don't benefit from jet cruise speed, and low acquisition/lease costs combined with cheap labor let carriers run high-frequency, low-fare schedules profitably even to thin markets. In the US, by contrast, mainline pilot unions' scope clauses at Delta, United, American, and Southwest strictly cap the number and size of aircraft that regional partners can fly on their behalf, and those clauses were negotiated around jets, not turboprops, largely because turboprops became politically and commercially unpopular with US passengers after decades of comfort complaints, the 2009 Colgan Air 3407 crash's aftermath, and the industry's post-2000s shift toward de Havilland/Bombardier and Embraer jets for regional flying.
For working pilots, this matters because the scope clause architecture directly shapes career pipelines and equipment assignments. Regional carriers like Envoy, PSA, SkyWest, and Republic operate almost exclusively RJs under capacity-purchase agreements with mainline partners, and the pilot seniority systems, pay scales, and flow-through agreements to mainline carriers are all built around that jet-centric fleet. A hypothetical reintroduction of turboprops at scale would require renegotiating scope clauses that unions have spent decades tightening, and mainline pilot groups have no incentive to concede ground that could be seen as ceding flying to cheaper turboprop operations—even if turboprops could serve thin routes more economically. This is why turboprops persist in the US primarily in niche corners: Cape Air's Cessna 402s and now Tecnam P2012s on Essential Air Service routes, Silver Airways' ATR fleet in Florida and the Bahamas, and a handful of Alaska bush operators where jet economics simply don't work and unions have less leverage.
The broader trend reinforces the pilot's frustration about $600 spoke-to-hub fares: US regional jet economics on sub-500-mile routes are genuinely poor. A 50-70 seat RJ burns more fuel per seat than an ATR, requires two type-rated pilots paid on jet pay scales, and has higher maintenance costs, yet mainline carriers still deploy them on short stage lengths because scope clauses and existing regional partner contracts leave little alternative. Combined with a persistent regional pilot shortage since 2021 that pushed first officer pay dramatically higher industry-wide, the cost structure for short-haul RJ flying has only gotten worse, and that cost gets passed through in fares on routes with limited competition. Airports in smaller US metros have seen reduced frequency and higher fares precisely because carriers are optimizing scarce RJ hours toward longer, more profitable stage lengths rather than the short hops where turboprops would excel.
This dynamic also explains why business aviation and fractional operators have shown renewed interest in turboprops like the Pilatus PC-12, TBM 960, and Cessna Denali—outside the union/scope-clause constraints of scheduled airline flying, turboprop economics reassert themselves clearly for short-to-medium missions, and Part 135 charter and Part 91K fractional programs have expanded turboprop offerings accordingly. On the Part 121 side, absent a major renegotiation of scope clauses or a strategic shift by a low-cost carrier willing to stand up a turboprop-based regional network from scratch, the American commercial fleet is likely to remain jet-dominant on scheduled service, leaving turboprops as the domain of EAS routes, island hopping, and niche charter operators rather than the mainstream spoke-to-hub solution that Asian carriers have shown can work well economically.