The scenario described in this r/flying post encapsulates one of the most misunderstood and frequently abused areas of flight time logging: the dual-PIC framework that applies during simulated instrument flight with a safety pilot. Under 14 CFR 61.51(e) and 91.109(c), a safety pilot serving as a required crewmember is entitled to log pilot-in-command time for the duration their presence is operationally required — meaning for all portions when the other pilot operates under a view-limiting device. Concurrently, the pilot under foggles may log that same block as both simulated instrument time and as PIC time based on sole manipulation of the controls. This lawful simultaneous logging of PIC time by both crewmembers is well-established, but it does not grant either pilot the right to log flight time for portions of the flight in which they held neither the controls nor an active crewmember function. The buddy in this account appears to be logging cross-country time for legs the original poster flew as sole manipulator, which constitutes a logbook entry that does not conform to the flight as it actually occurred — a distinction the FAA treats with particular seriousness under 14 CFR 61.59.
Logbook falsification carries consequences disproportionate to the apparent triviality of a few tenths of an hour. Under 61.59, intentionally falsifying any record required to be kept under Part 61 is grounds for certificate suspension or revocation and can result in civil penalty. The FAA's enforcement posture on logbook integrity has historically been unforgiving because the logbook is the foundational document of pilot qualification — it underlies every checkride, every medical, every job application, and every regulatory finding regarding currency and experience. For a student preparing for an instrument rating practical test, submitting a logbook that cannot be reconciled with the aircraft hobbs records, the flight school's billing logs, or the co-pilot's competing entries creates a document that a diligent examiner can and sometimes does flag. DPEs are not auditors and are not required to conduct forensic logbook analysis, but examiners who are experienced in time-building scenarios and dual-safety-pilot flights are familiar with the arithmetic — and a logbook showing near-total cross-country logging with correspondingly minimal entries from the stated safety pilot is an anomaly that invites scrutiny.
The operational question the original poster raises — whether a DPE will independently catch the discrepancy — reflects a common misunderstanding of how practical test preparation works. A DPE reviewing an instrument rating applicant's logbook will verify that the aeronautical experience requirements of 61.65 are met, and may query specific entries or cross-check totals, but the practical test standards do not mandate an entry-by-entry audit. Whether a given DPE probes deeply enough to identify the specific cross-country logging irregularity depends heavily on the individual examiner, the clarity of the entries, and whether anything in the logbook raises a flag. The more consequential enforcement risk materializes later: at a first officer interview, during an FAA inspection of a certificate holder's records, or in the event of an accident investigation that places the pilot's log under formal scrutiny. At those stages, inconsistencies between logbook entries and third-party records — school billing, aircraft squawk logs, the other pilot's competing logbook — can surface years after the checkride.
For professional and aspiring professional pilots, this scenario is a useful illustration of why logbook integrity matters beyond mere regulatory compliance. Regional airlines, Part 135 operators, and corporate flight departments treat logbook authenticity as a threshold hiring criterion. Background screening firms and airline HIMS/HR processes increasingly include cross-checks against records held by flight schools, FBOs, and prior employers. A pilot who enters professional aviation with a logbook that does not accurately reflect flight history — even by small margins accumulated during early training — carries latent professional risk. The foundational principle is uncomplicated: log what happened, log it accurately, and ensure the entries are defensible against the actual aircraft records. The broader implication of this case is not that DPEs will necessarily catch creative logging, but that professional aviation's documentation infrastructure eventually will.